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HIGH PRIORITIES: LAND USE, MARIJUANA, AND 
META-VALUES 
 
SPENSER OWENS 1* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 Zoning ordinances are legislative tools that cities and counties use to 
regulate the location, use, and physical character of land in their 
jurisdiction.2 Decisions about zoning affect the manner by which cities are 
organized, especially to the extent that they determine the number and 
nature of businesses that choose to locate within a given municipality.  
This Note will examine the motivations surrounding the adoption of 
zoning ordinances pertaining to the production and sale of marijuana 
through the lens of John Dewey’s theory of valuation. Applying Dewey’s 
theory to the zoning ordinances of a sampling of state and local 
governments, I will argue first that the choice of land uses to be regulated 
and restricted through local zoning ordinances is ultimately referable to 
values held by the community in which the ordinances are enacted. Second, 
I will argue that the decisions made on the state level carry more “value” as 
defined by Dewey’s theory and are, thus, entitled to greater weight if local 
zoning ordinances conflict with state law. 
The decisions that a municipality makes with respect to its zoning 
ordinances are of particular concern to businesses involved in the recently 
created legalized marijuana industry. There are 27 states that authorize the 
cultivation and sale of medical marijuana to treat certain medical 
conditions.3 Additionally, eight states permit the cultivation and sale of 
marijuana for adult recreational use.4 Municipalities in states where 
marijuana is legal in some form (medical or recreational) have two choices: 
to permit and regulate the production and sale of marijuana in accordance 
with state law, or to attempt to ban the production and sale of marijuana 
outright.  
Part I of this Note is a discussion of local zoning ordinances pertaining 
to marijuana businesses, beginning with a general overview of the 
 
 
1* J.D. Candidate, Washington University School of Law Class of 2018; B.A. Political Science & 
Philosophy, University of New Mexico Class of 2015. 
2 Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
3 As of the writing of this Note, there are 8 states that passed legalization initiatives during the 
2016 election cycle. Four of such states legalized marijuana for medical purposes, and another four states 
legalized recreational marijuana.  
4 State Policy, MARIJUANA POLICY PROJECT (Nov. 3, 2016, 9:01 AM), 
https://www.mpp.org/states/. 
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mechanics of zoning policies at the state and local level and their 
applications to medical and recreational marijuana. Part II introduces John 
Dewey’s theory of valuation and explains valuation in the context of group 
decision-making. Dewey’s normative-valuation theory is applied to state-
level policy decisions regarding marijuana in Part III, and it is then applied 
to local-level marijuana zoning policies in Part IV to illustrate conflicts 
between state and local policies. Part V synthesizes specific examples of 
conflicts between state and local policies and argues that values about 
values, or meta-values, ultimately govern such policy conflicts.  
 
Part I: Marijuana Zoning Ordinances 
 
A.   Overview of Zoning Law and Authority 
Cities and counties are generally permitted, within constitutional 
limits, to regulate and restrict uses, population densities, physical 
characteristics, and locations of land and buildings within their jurisdictions 
with zoning ordinances.5 Localities derive their authority to zone land from 
their state zoning enabling statute6 or home rule constitutional provision.7 
Zoning ordinances are generally legislative documents drafted and enacted 
by city and county governments and which may be enforced by specialized 
boards or commissions.8 Through such ordinances, municipalities set forth 
classifications of permitted and prohibited uses of land, and divide the 
locality into districts inside which certain uses are allowed. Use restrictions 
in zoning ordinances vary from locality to locality, typically due to varying 
legislative decisions that each municipal legislative body makes when 
drafting and amending the zoning ordinance.9 While a municipality may 
base its zoning decisions on an almost unlimited number of criteria, 
municipalities usually justify particular zoning decisions by arguing that 
public health, safety, and welfare are best served by the zoning decision.10 
 
 
5 Euclid, 272 U.S. at 388-89. The Supreme Court endorsed the constitutionality of zoning as a 
concept, and it preserved the ability of municipalities to enact zoning ordinances, so long as such 
ordinances do not run afoul of the Constitution of the United States and of the states in which the 
municipalities are located. 
6 See e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 125.3201 (West 2016).  
7 See e.g., G.A. CONST. ART. IX, § 2, PARA. IV. It is important to note that the authority conferred 
upon home rule municipalities may be modified to the extent authorized by the home rule provisions of 
the state constitution.  
8 See e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65850 (West 2000).  
9 See e.g., City of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926); W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn. 
v. Cambridge City Council, 779 N.E.2d 141, 149-50 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002). Separating uses from each 
other is seen to be sound public policy because it reduces the likelihood of incompatible uses locating 
near each other and creating nuisances. 
10 Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395. The police power grants municipalities broad authority to craft policies 
that are designed to address issues of local concern. Presumably any zoning decision that does not 
implicate fundamental rights and suspect-classes, does not exceed the grant of authority given to the 
municipality by the state, and is tailored to address the health, safety, and public welfare of the 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol10/iss2/8
  
 
 
 
 
2018]  HIGH PRIORITIES: LAND USE, MARIJUANA, AND META-VALUES  295 
 
 
 
 
This is especially true with zoning policies enacted in response to state-level 
marijuana legalization policies; cities often cite the public health, safety, 
and welfare when regulating marijuana uses.11 
 
B. Zoning Medical Marijuana 
 
Marijuana, even when used for medical purposes, is often zoned and 
regulated in a similar manner to establishments selling alcohol.12 San 
Francisco allows the cultivation and sale of medical marijuana within its 
jurisdiction, but stringently regulates the operation and placement of 
marijuana businesses.13 Medical marijuana dispensaries are only permitted 
in the Residential Commercial (RC) medium and high-density zones in San 
Francisco and must meet a set of permitting criteria in order to comply with 
the zoning code.14 Los Angeles County, by contrast, completely prohibits 
the commercial cultivation and sale of recreational and medical marijuana 
in each of its zoning classifications.15 The ability of local governments in 
California to completely prohibit medical marijuana facilities from all 
zoning classifications was upheld in 2013 on statutory grounds.16 The 
 
 
municipality is an acceptable exercise of the municipal police power. 
11 See, e.g., DENVER, CO, CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 6, art. V, § 6-200 (2017); L.A. COUNTY, CA, 
ZONING ORDINANCE, tit. 22, div. 1, ch. 22.04.040. Often, cities simply recite that the zoning code is 
enacted pursuant to the city’s power to promote the public health, safety, and general welfare under state 
law.   
12 See, e.g., DENVER, CO, CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 6 (“Alcoholic Beverages and Retail Marijuana 
Code”)(2017). Denver places retail marijuana under the same regulatory body as alcoholic beverages 
and many of the substantive regulations are identical between marijuana and alcohol. 
13
  S.F., CAL., HEALTH CODE art. 33, § 3303 (2005). It is unlawful for a medical marijuana 
dispensary to operate within the city without obtaining a permit from the San Francisco Health 
Department. The requirements to obtain such a permit include criminal background checks for all owners 
and employees of the dispensary, security measures provided for the proposed dispensary, and 
representations whether food or medical cannabis will be consumed on the premises. 
14 S.F., CAL., PLANNING CODE art. 2, § 209.3 (2017). A “high-density” zone permits one residential 
unit per 200 sq. feet of a given lot’s area. “Medium-density” zones allow one residential unit per 400 sq. 
feet of a lot’s area. In order for a medical cannabis dispensary to receive approval to operate within a 
residential commercial zone, the proprietor must apply for a medical cannabis dispensary permit from 
the city and the parcel on which the dispensary is to be located cannot be located within 1000 feet from 
any school or public facility. Additionally, the dispensary must allow for adequate ventilation to prevent 
marijuana odors escaping the building, must not be located near a substance abuse treatment facility, 
must not allow alcohol to be sold or consumed near the building, and must inform all owners and 
occupants of property within 300 feet of the parcel that a dispensary is applying for a permit. Finally, 
the completed permit application will be held for 30 days to allow for review by residents, occupants, 
owners of property, and neighborhood groups in the area. Once the conditions are met, the San Francisco 
Planning Commission may hold a discretionary hearing to decide whether to grant the application. It is 
important to note that the above requirements must be met in addition to the requirements under the 
Health Code at note 13, supra. 
15 L.A. COUNTY, CAL., CODE OF ORDINANCES 22.66.020 (2017). 
16 City of Riverside v. Inland Empire Patients Health & Wellness Center, Inc., 56 Cal. 4th 729 
(2013) (holding that the California Medical Marijuana Program (MMP) does not preempt municipalities 
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difference between two cities in the same state highlights the fact that local 
policies can vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, even in the presence of a 
general statewide policy with respect to a given issue. San Francisco allows 
the cultivation of medical marijuana in the city limits, but Los Angeles 
County completely prohibits all commercial marijuana cultivation.17 The 
variance in the policies is made even starker by the presence of the uniform 
state policy of legalized medical marijuana. Below, in Parts III and IV, I 
will expand upon the reasons that lie behind local policy variances. Inter-
local non-uniformity in recreational marijuana policy is even more 
pronounced. 
 
C. Zoning Recreational Marijuana 
 
Local zoning policies with respect to recreational marijuana are even less 
uniform than with medical marijuana. For example, Monument, Colorado 
restricts the cultivation of recreational marijuana to accessory uses of 
residences.18 Monument also imposes further restrictions on the visibility 
and number of plants that can be grown by a property owner.19 Monument’s 
zoning code only allows the commercial sale of marijuana in the context of 
medical marijuana dispensaries, which are permitted in the Commercial 
zoning designation as a conditional use only.20 By contrast, Denver 
currently permits marijuana dispensaries within certain zoning districts, 
though it places significant restrictions on building specifications, location 
within the municipality, and mandatory spacing requirements through its 
zoning ordinance.21 The Denver Zoning Code does not permit growing 
marijuana plants as an accessory use in a residential zone where marijuana 
 
 
from enacting ordinances that prohibit medical marijuana dispensaries within their borders because the 
MMP does not confer rights to convenient access of medical marijuana). 
17 L.A. COUNTY, CAL., CODE OF ORDINANCES 22.66.020 (2017). At the time of writing, Los 
Angeles County is expected to adopt a more comprehensive regulatory framework to govern commercial 
cultivation and sale of marijuana, but continued its pre-legalization ban on marijuana enterprises in its 
zoning code in the meantime. Id. 
18 MONUMENT, COLO., ZONING CODE § 17.05.010 (2016). An accessory use is defined as a use 
that is “naturally and normally incidental to, subordinate to and devoted exclusively to the main use of 
the premises.” Common examples of accessory uses are large gardens and greenhouses. 
19 Id. A property owner may have no more than six flowering adult marijuana plants, and they must 
not be visible from the exterior of the property.  
20 MONUMENT, COLO., ZONING CODE §§ 17.36.030(A), (C) (2018). Conditional uses are subject 
to discretionary approval by the municipal zoning commission, which means that the municipality may 
deny a conditional use application, notwithstanding its sufficiency, on the basis that medical marijuana 
dispensaries do not comport with the public health, safety, or welfare for the community in which the 
conditional use is sought.  
21
 DENVER, COLO., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 59 § 59-2 (2018). In addition to being excluded 
from 97 zoning designations, retail marijuana stores may not be located within 1000 feet of any school, 
drug or alcohol treatment facility, child care center, or other marijuana store. Such regulations severely 
limit potential sites for retail marijuana stores and cultivation facilities. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol10/iss2/8
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is sold at a licensed marijuana dispensary.22 
 
 D.  Relationship Between State and Local Policy 
 
The policy differences between San Francisco, Los Angeles County, 
Monument, and Denver shows that municipalities make unique zoning 
decisions with respect to medical and recreational marijuana, despite the 
presence of statewide policy that permits its cultivation, sale, and use. The 
variance of intrastate municipal zoning policies is due, in part, to the 
intrastate balance of power between states and local governments.  
Local governments have no independent basis for their existence in the 
United States Constitution. Instead, cities derive their existence and 
authority from a grant of power by a state government, powers of which 
originate in the reservation of power to states under the Constitution.23 
When defining the contours of municipal power, States generally take one 
of two approaches: one that subordinates local governments to state law and 
one that grants local governments broader authority of self-government. 
Arising out of the subordination of local governments to state authority is 
Dillon’s Rule, which is used to determine the contours of a local 
government’s authority as delegated to it by the state.24 In states that apply 
Dillon’s Rule, local governments generally have only those powers 
specifically and expressly granted by the state government and those powers 
that are implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted.25  
Many states reject Dillon’s Rule and give broader authority to local 
governments through home rule.26 Home rule comes in two forms, one form 
that conceptualizes local governments as sovereigns within a sovereign, and 
another form that grants plenary power to a local government that is not 
specifically reserved by the state government.27 Home rule cities have far 
greater discretion to make zoning decisions than local governments in states 
 
 
22 Id. 
23 Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I – The Structure of Local Government Law, 90 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1990) [hereinafter “Our Localism”]. The legal status of localities are conceptualized in 
three ways: “creature, delegate, and agent.” A locality as creature of the state owes its existence to an 
act of the state, which has “plenary power to alter, expand, contract, or abolish at will any or all local 
units.” As a delegate of the state, the locality possesses only such power as the state confers upon it, 
which may be altered at any time and for any reason by the state. A locality, as agent for the state, 
exercises its delegated powers within its jurisdiction on behalf of the state. Dillon’s Rule is a reflection 
of the tri-partite legal status of cities mentioned above and cabins the authority that a city or local 
government can assert to those powers explicitly granted to it by state governments. 
24 Id. at 8 (quoting D. Mandelker, D. Netsch & P. Salsich, State and Local Government in a Federal 
System: Cases and Materials 83 (2d ed. 1983)). 
25 Id.  
26 Id. at 9. 
27 Id. at 9-10. 
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following Dillon’s Rule.28 The discretion provided by home rule allows 
local governments like San Francisco, Los Angeles County, Denver, and 
Monument to enact zoning policies that comport with local values, needs, 
and desires, instead of being forced to comply with a single statewide policy 
as they would in a state that follows Dillon’s Rule. The choice between 
policies based on individual and community values is best explained by 
John Dewey’s Social Value Theory. This theory aids in the explanation of 
why concepts such as Dillon’s Rule and home rule govern the relationship 
between state and local laws. 
 
Part II: Dewey’s Social Value Theory 
 
A. Overview of Social Value Theory 
 
John Dewey’s Social Value Theory can be reduced to the following: 
“…[A]ll deliberate, all planned human conduct, personal and collective, 
seems to be influenced, if not controlled, by estimates of value or worth of 
ends to be attained.”29 Human behavior that is taken with forethought is, at 
the very least, influenced by perceptions of values. Such values are formed 
by a manner of valuation that Dewey describes: “…[V]aluation in its 
connection with desire is linked to existential situations and that it differs 
with differences in its existential context.”30 The “desire” that Dewey 
discusses is an end, a goal to be attained through deliberate conduct. The 
“existential situations” with which Dewey is concerned is a state of 
objective facts as they exist at a given time that a value judgment is made. 
Any given valuation depends on the “existential situations;” as the objective 
facts surrounding a situation change, so too does the valuation itself change. 
 Dewey’s method of valuation states that a value judgment is a 
judgment regarding the state of objective facts as they exist in a given 
situation at any given time.31 Actors who evaluate alternative courses of 
action do so with an end in view, or a goal to be attained by undertaking the 
potential courses of action.32 According to Dewey, the method by which 
alternative courses of action are evaluated is by comparing the potential 
course of action in light of the end in view and determined by facts existing 
at the time the evaluation is done.33 
 Dewey’s valuation method is interpreted by some to state that humans 
derive normative values from a descriptive set of facts based on objective 
 
 
28 As of the writing of this Note, there are currently 41 home rule states, including California, 
Colorado, and Michigan. 
29 John Dewey, THEORY OF VALUATION 2 (1939) [hereinafter “THEORY OF VALUATION”]. 
30 Id. at 16-17. 
31 Id. at 22. 
32 Id. at 23. 
33 Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol10/iss2/8
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criteria that are specific to the situation in which they present themselves to 
the one deriving the value.34 The normative value-proposition that is to be 
derived can be stated as “If situation, Y, is to be resolved, then I ought to 
pursue course of action, X.” Any given situation is comprised of objective 
facts that are perceived by an evaluator. Once an evaluator perceives the 
situation, they conceive of a resolution to the situation. The evaluator then 
considers alternative courses of action that will carry into effect the 
resolution of the situation. If the evaluator believes that the situation should 
be resolved, then the evaluator will choose the course of action that is most 
likely to resolve the situation. The criteria that the evaluator considers when 
deciding whether a course of action is superior to another course of action 
is dependent on the particular facts of the situation. Thus, the evaluator’s 
prescriptive belief about an objective fact (that a situation should be 
resolved) transfers to the objective fact that a course of action is the most 
conducive to resolving the situation and generates the value-proposition 
stated above. Generally speaking, the means that is objectively the most 
conducive to resolving the situation is described as “good” and means less 
conducive to resolving the situation are described as “less good” or “bad.”35  
An example of this is found in a game of chess, wherein the two players 
each seek to capture or corner the opposing player’s king piece. There are 
an immense number of moves that each player can make to simply move 
pieces according to the game’s rules that would play the game, yet fewer 
that would objectively accomplish the game’s objective of capturing the 
opposing player’s king piece. Applying the normative-value proposition 
derived above from the perspective of one of the chess players, the 
“situation” in this example is capturing the opposing player’s king piece. 
The situation is couched in a set of objective facts as they exist at a particular 
time, namely the configuration of the chess pieces on the chessboard at any 
given time. Given each player’s ultimate goal (to win by capturing the 
 
 
34 See JOHN DEWEY, THEORY OF THE MORAL LIFE 112 (1960); see also Gail Kennedy, The Hidden 
Link in Dewey’s Theory of Evaluation, 52 J. PHIL 85, 91 (1955). 
35 THEORY OF VALUATION, supra note 29 at 34. “…[V]aluation takes place only when there is 
something the matter; when there is some trouble to be done away with, some need, lack, or privation 
to be made good, some conflict of tendencies to be resolved by means of changing existing 
condition…the end-in-view is formed and projected as that which, if acted upon, will supply the existing 
need or lack and resolve the existing conflict.” Dewey further develops “goodness” as having two 
aspects, the immediate aspect and the contributory aspect. The immediate good is an “intrinsic” good, 
or that which one determines to be good in itself. By contrast, a contributory good is something that is 
“good” for something else, for example a hammer is “good” for driving nails, but is not “good” for other, 
non-nail related, tasks. See John Dewey, Valuation and Experimental Knowledge, 31 PHIL. REV. n. 4 
325, 326 (1922). For purposes of this Note, normative discussions of what is “good” are references to 
“good” in its contributory sense. 
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opposing king) and the configuration of the chess pieces on the chessboard, 
there is a finite set of moves that a player could make that conform with the 
rules of the game. Of these permissible moves, there is a smaller set of 
moves that, directly or indirectly, advance or accomplish the ultimate 
objective of capturing the opposing king. There is an even smaller 
subcategory of these moves that have objectively distinguishable features, 
such as permissible moves that capture the opposing king in the least 
amount of turns, or moves that are designed to delay the inevitable end of 
the game so as to prolong each player’s enjoyment of the match.  
A player’s values come into play in the objectively distinguishable 
features of the permissible moves that advance the game. A player could 
conceivably want to win the chess game in the fewest turns as possible, and 
such a desire would be accomplished by making those moves that actually 
do conduce to winning the game in as few turns as possible. Therefore, the 
normative-value proposition that emerges from this example is “If Player P 
desires to win the chess game in the fewest number of turns, then P ought 
to make move M1, M2, M3…” It can thus be said that a move that is 
conducive to winning the game in as few turns as possible, in this context, 
is a “good” move, and the evaluation of what “good” means is determined 
by objectively verifiable facts unique to the situation.36 A normative value 
statement was drawn from an objective set of facts. 
 
B. Valuation in Collective Decision-Making  
 
When expanded from one person to a group of persons, namely a 
decision-making body, it is logical that the same evaluative process 
discussed above results in the formation of values that guide the decisions 
adopted by that body.37 A decision-making body is comprised of 
individuals, who each undertake the evaluative process on an individual 
level, and who are asked to derive values and create policy as a group. 
Problems of policy present themselves to such collectives, and such 
 
 
36 THEORY OF VALUATION, supra note 29 at 24. “These propositions in their generalized form may 
rest upon scientifically warranted empirical propositions and are themselves capable of being tested by 
observation of results actually attained as compared with those intended.” Id. This evaluation of good 
reflects Dewey’s idea of contributory good, or that which is good “for something else.” Here, a “good” 
chess move is one that accomplishes the objective of the game, which is the “something else.” In further 
support of this, Dewey characterizes the value derivation process (“judgments of value”) as the 
connection of objects or acts in relation to certain contemplated ends and consequences. THEORY OF THE 
MORAL LIFE, supra note 34 at 122.  
37 THEORY OF VALUATION, supra note 29 at 60. “If, on the other hand, investigation shows that a 
given set of existing valuations, including the rules for their enforcement, be such as to release individual 
potentialities of desire and interest, and does so in a way that contributes to mutual reinforcement of the 
desires and interests of all members of a group, it is impossible for this knowledge not to serve as a 
bulwark of the particular set of valuations in question, and to induce intensified effort to sustain them in 
existence.” 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol10/iss2/8
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problems can be addressed by policy decisions. The policy decisions that a 
legislature adopts are the courses of action (or inaction) that the members 
of the legislature perceive, given the particular circumstances of the policy 
problem, will be best suited to addressing the problem. As noted above, the 
prescriptive belief that a problem should be solved transforms into a 
prescriptive belief that a given course of action is most conducive to solving 
the problem. It is important to note that in the context of multiple evaluators, 
as in a decision-making body, the possibility that different courses of action 
are seen to be the most conducive to resolving the situation becomes 
problematic.38 Differences of opinions as to the superior course of action 
may arise from evaluators using different sets of facts to evaluate the 
possible courses of action, evaluators perceiving the situation itself 
differently, or even objective mistakes of fact made by the evaluators.39 
 For example, recall the example of the chess game. Instead of two 
players, there are ten players, five on each team. In order to make a move, 
the majority of players on one team must first agree on the move to make. 
Each member of each team must first assess the state of the game board in 
a similar fashion to each of the players in the previous chess example. Then 
the team members must communicate their understanding of the state of the 
game board with each other and come to a consensus regarding the same.40 
Once this is done, the members of the team will assess the goal that the team 
is going to pursue, in light of the configuration of the chess board and pieces. 
For purposes of this example, it is assumed that the team members agree 
that the goal for the team is to win the chess game in as few turns as possible. 
Once the goal is set, the team members will evaluate different possible 
moves, in the same manner as the individual players in the previous 
example. Eventually, the team members will arrive at a set of moves that 
are conducive to winning the game in as few moves as possible. The team 
members must then choose from among these moves. As stated, a majority 
 
 
38 John Dewey, PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS 203 (1927) [hereinafter PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS]. 
Dewey argues that differences of opinion with respect to the adoption of a given course of action are 
difficult, if not impossible to eliminate. What is important, Dewey argues, is that the differences of 
opinion will be based on observable and verifiable fact evidence, rather than on unsubstantiated beliefs. 
39 Id. at 207. The act of public deliberation, of social evaluation, causes the public to come to terms 
with the fact that there are shared ends and interests to be sought by the public. Dewey notes here that 
the public rarely comes to a consensus on exactly what the shared interests are, but it is important that 
the public recognizes that shared interests are revealed through the deliberative method. This recognition 
can, and often does, result in social action and legislation based upon shared interests revealed through 
deliberation. 
40 Coming to a consensus about the facts of a situation is often where disagreement arises in 
deliberative bodies. In such cases, one perspective must prevail if a decision is to be made, especially in 
a democratic body. 
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of the team members must agree on the most appropriate move to make in 
order to make a move. By way of discussion, debate, and persuasion, a 
majority of the team would make their decision as to the move to make, and 
such move would be made. The process would start anew as the opposing 
team decides which move to make in response.  
The assessment of the state of the board by each of the team members is 
identical to the assessment of the board by the individual chess players 
discussed above. This assessment allows each team member to observe and 
gather information about the factual situation at hand. When the team 
members communicate with each other about what each of them perceives 
the factual situation at hand to be, they come to a consensus regarding the 
objectively verifiable facts as they exist on the board at that time. When the 
team members get together to decide which move to make, they do so with 
the factual situation in mind and with the goal of winning the game in as 
few turns as possible. Thus the team members derive a normative-value 
proposition as a group: “If we want to win the chess game in as few moves 
as possible, and given the current configuration of the board, we ought to 
make move M1, M2, M3, etc…” 41 
 As illustrated above, the problem of diverging views regarding the 
optimal course of action is significantly mitigated by the fact that decision-
making bodies often agree on a certain set of objectively verifiable facts and 
come to a unified decision regarding action, often in accordance with 
majoritarian principles. Plurality rule in such bodies allows groups to debate 
and attempt to persuade others in order to form a consensus that will agree 
to the shared set of facts and a derived normative-value proposition. The 
shared set of facts allows a legislative body to act in a similar fashion as an 
individual with respect to its method of evaluating potential courses of 
action.  
 In cases where it is not possible for a body to agree on a shared set of 
facts, or where the set of facts decided upon is not clear, then it is unlikely 
that a unified value will be derived. Instead, more than one value is likely 
to be created, if any are created at all, based upon facts that are agreed upon 
and objectively verifiable.42 In the rare instance of two or more courses of 
action being equally conducive to resolving the problem at hand, then 
criteria outside of the given set of facts is likely to control the final decision 
rendered by the body.43  
 
 
41 See THEORY OF THE MORAL LIFE, supra note 34 at 122. 
42 See id. at 203. 
43 Timothy V. Kaufman-Osborn, John Dewey and the Liberal Science of Community, 46 J. POL. n. 
4 1142, 1152. Dewey’s political theory regarding democracy makes explicit the function of democratic 
citizens to “transcend the self which they would otherwise bring to the political arena and which would 
otherwise hinder their individual participation in efforts of collective control[.]”  
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 Diverging views with respect to a proposed course of action are 
unavoidable in democratic institutions. When a decision-making body acts 
only with the approval of a majority of its members, the deliberative process 
in which the body engages becomes enormously significant. Every 
individual member of the body engages in Deweyan valuation on an 
individual level insofar that they each make value judgments about what 
issues are important to take up and which political stances they ought to 
adopt.44 Each separate member of the body understands that they are part of 
a decision-making process, and thus they understand that if decisions are to 
be made, then they must engage with the other members of the body in 
forming a majority to vote in favor of such decision. To this end, the 
engagement between members with the common goal of coming to a 
decision for a body is deliberation. This deliberation, even when it is merely 
a recognition of the fact that a decision is to be made, is Dewey’s method 
of valuation at work. Thus, legislators engage in Deweyan valuation 
individually and collectively when they develop policy. 
Collective actions, such as actions by a state, are also influenced and 
controlled by values derived according to the aforementioned valuation 
method. Thus legislatures qua states that undertake deliberative legislative 
action are influenced by the same values that have been described. Dewey’s 
conception of the state illustrates this point insofar that he believed that 
public bodies direct human action according to two ends or consequences.45 
The first consequence is that which applies to those directly involved in the 
action, namely the legislators or policy makers themselves.46 The second 
consequence considered by the public body is that which affects 
constituencies besides those who are immediately involved in the proposed 
course of action, namely the constituencies of the legislators or the public-
at-large.47 Dewey’s formulation of the second consequence taken into 
account by public bodies is illustrative of a form of quasi-agency, whereby 
legislators act for, or on behalf of, others. Thus, legislation is a reflection 
and codification of the individual and collective values of the legislators and 
the legislature.48 
 
 
44 Id. 
45 TERRY HOY, THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN DEWEY: TOWARD A CONSTRUCTIVE 
RENEWAL 98 (1998) [hereinafter “HOY”]. 
46 PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS, supra note 38 at 12; see also id. 
47 HOY, supra note 45 at 98. 
48 William R. Caspary, DEWEY ON DEMOCRACY 141 (2000). According to Caspary, Dewey’s 
theory of valuation predicts that individual citizens receive and digest information disseminated to the 
public and eventually arrive at a “responsible” public judgment that possesses the same character of a 
well-conducted individual deliberation and decision. Caspary argues that Dewey himself did not develop 
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Part III: Values, State Law, and Marijuana 
 
A. Medical Marijuana Policy 
Medical marijuana is legal in twenty-nine states.49 The statutes that 
authorize the cultivation, distribution, and use of medical marijuana differ 
in each state, indicating they reflect different social values. California and 
Michigan took different approaches with respect to their medical marijuana 
legalization programs and the interpretation of the laws legalizing medical 
marijuana by their respective state supreme courts.50 These different 
approaches reflect different legislative and policy values. 
Strictly speaking, California’s Compassionate Use Act and Medical 
Marijuana Program is not a direct authorization of medical marijuana. 
California’s Compassionate Use Act51 imparts negative rights, or freedom 
from criminal liability, on medical marijuana patients insofar that card-
carrying medical marijuana patients possess affirmative defenses in any 
criminal prosecution arising from or relating to their possession and use of 
medical marijuana obtained from a licensed medical marijuana facility.52 
The CUA and its implementing legislation also immunizes licensed 
physicians in California from prosecution for prescribing medical marijuana 
to patients, provided that the prescription given to the patient is for the 
treatment of enumerated illnesses and conditions.53  
The CUA is the result of a referendum action by the people of 
California and was further implemented in 2003 in specificity by the 
California legislature.54 If Dewey is correct, the CUA reflects the values of 
the voters of California and the legislature.  
Subsection (b)(1)(A) of the CUA sets forth one of its main purposes, 
which is to preserve the right of seriously ill Californians to procure and use 
marijuana to assist in the treatment of their ailments as recommended by a 
licensed physician.55 The values that Subsection (b)(1)(A) evinces are 
 
 
a specific application of his social-value theory to legislators and policy-makers, but instead focused his 
attention on making sense of the essence of public life and democracy as a community. 
49 State Policy, MARIJUANA POLICY PROJECT (Mar. 12, 2018, 9:01 AM), 
https://www.mpp.org/states/. 
50 See, e.g., City of Riverside v. Inland Empire Patients Health & Wellness Center, Inc., 56 Cal. 
4th 729, 760-61 (2013)(“The sole effect of the statute’s substantive terms is to exempt specified medical 
marijuana activities from enumerated state criminal and nuisance statutes.”); see also Beek v. City of 
Wyoming, 495 Mich. Appt. Ct. 1 (2014).  
51 Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11362.5 (2016). 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 2003 Cal. Stat. Ch. 875. 
55 Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11362.5(b)(1)(A) (West 2016); see also [Bill Analysis Report of 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol10/iss2/8
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illustrative of the values reflected by the entire CUA. It is easy to conceive 
of a possible situation that the California voters and legislature deemed best 
addressed by placing health care decisions in the hands of the people most 
affected by such decisions: the patients themselves.56 Popular sentiment in 
the months leading up to the vote on the CUA reflected an attitude favoring 
protecting the rights of individuals to make their own medical decisions. 57  
The protection of one’s personal freedom to make significant healthcare 
decisions with the advice and recommendation of one’s doctor indicates that 
individual liberty is a value that the people of California and the California 
legislature took into consideration when they voted in favor of the CUA. 
Related to this point is a rejection of paternalism to the extent that 
Subsection (b)(1)(A) acknowledges that the decision to use medical 
marijuana to treat a patient’s illness is a decision should be reserved to that 
patient and their doctor, rather than to the public.  
In this context, the problem perceived by the California voters in 
approving Proposition 215 was the foreclosure of a valid health care option 
by the federal government. The facts surrounding the situation were such 
that California citizens suffering from cancer and other serious illnesses 
were being prevented from utilizing a safe and effective drug to treat their 
condition by the federal government.58 California voters determined that the 
most conducive manner of resolving the problem they perceived was to 
allow California patients to exercise their health care options by undergoing 
a course of action that decriminalizes the possession and use of medical 
marijuana for patients suffering from qualifying conditions. The initiative 
process allowed California voters to instruct their lawmakers to listen to 
their values and make policy accordingly. 
 
 
SB 420 by CA Senate Health and Human Services Committee, 
http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billAnalysisClient.xhtml] and David Ferrell & Dan Weikel, High 
Emotions: Measure’s Passage Stirs Strong Support and Harsh Criticism, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1996. The 
main proponents of Proposition 215 were seriously ill patients who relied on marijuana to directly treat 
the symptoms of their ailments or used it to mitigate the harsh side effects of their prescribed 
medications. The nature of the popular initiative process in California left the CUA in need of legal 
clarification, which was accomplished by the California legislature in 2003 with SB 420 (Medical 
Marijuana Program Act). SB 420 sought to provide a more detailed legal framework for medical 
marijuana to proceed under in California than was provided by Proposition 215. 
56 Eric Bailey, 6 Wealthy Donors Aid Measure on Marijuana, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1996, at 18. 
Arguments in favor of voting for Proposition 215 were seen very poignantly in T.V. commercials aired 
in California prior to the 1996 election. Such commercials featured depictions of seriously ill cancer 
patients and survivors who purported to use marijuana to treat their illnesses. 
57 See note 55 infra. 
58 David Ferrell & Dan Weikel, High Emotions: Measure’s Passage Stirs Strong Support and 
Harsh Criticism, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1996, http://articles.latimes.com/1996-11-07/news/mn-
62202_1_high-emotions. 
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California legislators explicitly considered and reinforced the values 
demanded by the public in the original initiative when drafting a fix to the 
law in 2003, which would eventually be known as the Medical Marijuana 
Program Act (MMPA)59. In the years following the 1996 referendum, law 
enforcement officials had difficulty distinguishing between citizens who 
were treating legitimate and serious health conditions with medical 
marijuana and those citizens who were falsely claiming they had serious 
medical problems as a pretext to obtain and use marijuana without fear of 
criminal prosecution under state law.60 
The California state senators who drafted the MMPA and a majority of 
the rest of the legislators through their affirmative votes agreed that the 
problem was one that needed to be fixed.61 The majority of the California 
legislators agreed on the text of Senate Bill 42062 and included a statement 
of purpose for the bill, which is equivalent to a set of agreed upon facts 
discussed in Part II, above.63 The California legislature found that the means 
most conducive to addressing the problem that they perceived would be to 
adopt an identification card program in order to better identify qualified 
medical marijuana patients and ensure they would not be unnecessarily 
subjected to criminal prosecution.  The value that thus emerges from the 
California legislature’s actions is that the CUA, as a matter of state policy, 
was worth obeying and expanding upon through legislative action. The 
legislature enshrined the will of the California voters who supported the 
CUA by undertaking the deliberative policy-making process and overlaying 
their own policy values on top those of the voters of California. This is 
shown by the legislative history surrounding Senate Bill 420.64 
Michigan’s medical marijuana program followed a similar trajectory 
as in California, though the legislature guided the legalization process in 
Michigan. Michigan’s medical marijuana legalization measure was 
intended to protect medical marijuana users from criminal prosecution and 
civil penalty and to create an administrative system that regulates the 
cultivation, sale, distribution, and use of medical marijuana by qualifying 
 
 
59 Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11362.7 et seq. (West/Deering 2018). 
60 Bill Analysis of Senate Bill 420, CALIFORNIA SENATE COMMITTEE ON HEALTH AND HUMAN 
SERVICES, April 9, 2003. “Proposition 215 made a clear policy statement regarding access to medical 
marijuana, but left to the Legislature and courts responsibility for many key legal definitions, design of 
a medical marijuana distribution system, guidance to law enforcement officers, and protection of 
physicians, caregivers, and patients.” 
61 Legislative History at 289, California Senate 2003-04 Session. SB 420 gathered 24 “Aye” votes 
compared to 14 “No” votes. 
62 2003 Cal. Stat. c. 875, §1. 
63 See supra note 34. 
64 Bill Analysis of Senate Bill 420, CALIFORNIA SENATE COMMITTEE ON HEALTH AND HUMAN 
SERVICES, April 9, 2003. 
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patients.65 The wording of the measure is similar to California’s Proposition 
215 insofar that it does not, on its face, create a right to access medical 
marijuana, but rather a defense against adverse legal action predicated on 
the basis of a marijuana patient or caregiver’s cultivation, possession, and 
use of medical marijuana.66 In this way, the Michigan Medical Marihuana 
Program is a system of negative rights and resembles Proposition 215. 
Giving patients access to medical marijuana, and thus the creation of 
negative rights, was seen by Michigan voters as the means most conducive 
to accomplishing a perceived end-in-view: granting seriously ill Michigan 
citizens, with the advice of their physicians, the discretion to choose medical 
marijuana as an option to treat their ailments.67 [Re work this last sentence 
to reflect that the focus was more on access, rather than negative rights.] 
The value that arises from the adoption of the Michigan Medical Marihuana 
Program is similar to the value that motivated California voters to adopt 
Proposition 215: If seriously ill patients in Michigan are to have the freedom 
to choose effective medication for the treatment of their illnesses, then the 
state of Michigan ought to immunize medical marijuana patients from 
criminal liability under state law. The declaration of purpose for the 
Michigan Medical Marihuana Program reflects this view.68  
As stated above, state medical marijuana policy in California and 
Michigan was crafted by the people of each respective states.69 The citizens 
of each state decided that seriously ill patients with ailments that are 
treatable with marijuana ought not to be prosecuted and they acted upon 
their decision by conferring negative rights upon medical marijuana 
patients. The stated declarations of purpose of the Compassionate Use Act 
and the Michigan Medical Marihuana Programs each reflects what Dewey 
terms a “negative end-in-view,” which is the employment of means that 
“inhibit the operation of conditions producing the obnoxious result” and that 
“enable positive conditions to operate as resources and thereby to effect a 
result which is, in the highest possible sense, positive in content.”70 A 
Deweyan characterization of the Compassionate Use Act and the Michigan 
 
 
65 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.26424(a) (West 2008). 
66 Id. 
67 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.26422 (West 2008). “The people of the State of Michigan find 
and declare that…changing state law will have the practical effect of protecting from arrest the vast 
majority of seriously ill people who have a medical need to use marijuana.” 
68 Id.  
69 The people directly expressed their values in California, and the California legislature adopted 
and expanded upon those values. Michigan citizens expressed their values indirectly through their state 
legislators. 
70 THEORY OF VALUATION, supra note 29, at 48. 
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Medical Marijuana Program is that the prosecution of seriously ill medical 
marijuana patients for possession of marijuana that treats their illnesses 
(“obnoxious result”) is “inhibited” by affording a freedom from prosecution 
for qualifying medical marijuana patients in order to effect greater access 
for medical marijuana patients to treatment of their illnesses (“positive 
condition.”) Simply put, the voters of California, Michigan, and every other 
state with similarly worded medical marijuana voter referendums statutes 
valued the negative freedom of medical marijuana patients in those states, 
just as the chess team valued playing the game to win.  
 
B. Recreational Marijuana laws 
 
Colorado voters approved Amendment 64 on November 6th, 2012.71 
This measure amends the Colorado constitution and is a mandate to the 
Colorado legislature to formulate and implement a regulatory system to 
permit and regulate recreational marijuana cultivation, distribution, and use 
in Colorado.72 Colorado’s legislature passed implementation legislation 
soon after the voters approved Amendment 64.73  
Under Colorado’s legalization measure, a person over the age of 
twenty-one may possess up to one ounce of marijuana, and may grow up to 
six marijuana plants, only three of which may be flowering at one time.74 
Possession of more than the statutorily permitted amount is still illegal 
under state law, and it is a felony to remove marijuana from Colorado 
outside of its borders.75 Marijuana use is not permitted in public areas, and 
property owners are free to prohibit marijuana from their premises.76 The 
legalization measure also leaves unaffected the ability of employers to 
decline to hire or terminate employees who consume marijuana.77 
The proponents of legalization of marijuana for recreational use 
implicitly argued that a statewide system that taxes and regulates the 
recreational use of marijuana has more social utility than a system that 
criminalizes the cultivation, possession, distribution, and use of marijuana.78 
 
 
71 Sadie Gurman, Coloradans Say Yes to Recreational Use of Marijuana, DENVER POST (Nov. 6, 
2012, 10:07 AM), http://www.denverpost.com/2012/11/06/coloradans-say-yes-to-recreational-use-of-
marijuana/. 
72 COLO. CONST. ART. XVIII, § 16(2). 
73 2013 COLO. SESS. LAWS 1826. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. See also COLO. CONST. ART. XVIII, § 16(6). 
77 Id. 
78 Barry Petersen & Phil Hirschkorn, Colo. Bid to Legalize Marijuana Leads in Polls, CBS NEWS 
(Oct. 14, 2012, 10:01 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/colo-bid-to-legalize-marijuana-leads-in-
polls. Proponents of recreational legalization in Colorado argued that legalization and regulation of 
marijuana would result in a substantial increase in tax revenue for the state and would ultimately reduce 
the influence of illegal drug cartels within the state. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol10/iss2/8
  
 
 
 
 
2018]  HIGH PRIORITIES: LAND USE, MARIJUANA, AND META-VALUES  309 
 
 
 
 
This view ultimately prevailed, though because local governments have the 
discretion to adopt policies specific to their jurisdiction, the statewide policy 
of legalization of marijuana did not translate to a statewide policy of access 
to legalized marijuana. The statute features a specific provision that 
preserved the rights of local governments to restrict and ban the sale of 
recreational marijuana from their jurisdictions.79 Retaining authority on the 
part of local governments in Colorado results in local governments having 
different policies with respect to the commercial sale and distribution of 
recreational marijuana. For example, the city of Denver allows the sale of 
recreational marijuana in accordance with Proposition 6480, but the city of 
Monument has banned all non-medical marijuana sales through excluding 
such uses from its zoning ordinance.81 Allowing localities to determine 
whether they will prohibit marijuana dispensaries permits local authorities 
to guide local policy and puts local authorities in the best position to craft 
the policies that will most benefit these communities. If given the authority, 
local policymakers could conclude that the community is not benefited by 
the presence of a marijuana dispensary and that local goals are best served 
by prohibiting marijuana dispensaries from the community.  
The fact that local governments in Colorado are permitted to set their 
own policy with respect to recreational marijuana evinces a value judgment 
to that effect by Colorado citizens when Proposition 64 was enacted. This 
value judgment is borne out through express reservations of authority for 
local governments to outright prohibit the operation of marijuana cultivation 
facilities, marijuana retail operations, and marijuana testing facilities. 
Essentially, Coloradan voters and lawmakers faced a situation in which a 
large portion of Coloradans did not favor the legalization of marijuana for 
recreational purposes, notwithstanding Proposition 64’s popularity prior to 
its passage. 
When considering whether to amend the state constitution to allow 
local governments to decide to prohibit recreational marijuana, Colorado 
voters implicitly expressed the normative-value statements, “If we want to 
respect the wishes of those Coloradans who are in favor of legalizing 
marijuana for recreational purposes, then we ought to vote in favor of 
legalization state-wide. If we want to respect the wishes of those Coloradans 
who are not in favor of legalizing marijuana for recreational purposes, then 
we ought to allow local governments to ‘opt-out’ of legalization by 
permitting such local governments to prohibit recreational marijuana sales 
 
 
79 Colo. Const. art. XVIII, § 16(6). 
80 See supra note 11. 
81 See supra note 20. 
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and cultivation from their jurisdictions.”82 
These dual normative-value statements explain the reservation of local 
authority contained in Proposition 64 and its implementation legislation. If 
residents of a locality feel strongly about their opposition to recreational 
marijuana in their jurisdiction, then such residents are empowered by the 
constitution of the state of Colorado to lobby for an ordinance that prohibits 
recreational marijuana sales and cultivation from that locality and otherwise 
comports with state law. Local marijuana policy is also guided by normative 
values. 
 
Part IV: Values, Local Ordinances, and Marijuana 
 
A. Medical Marijuana 
In 2010, two years after the passage the Michigan Medical Marihuana 
Program by the Michigan legislature in 2008, the City of Wyoming, 
Michigan enacted an ordinance that purported to exclude the cultivation of 
marijuana as a permitted use in all zoning designations in the city.83 This 
meant that any cultivation of medical marijuana within the city of Wyoming 
would be a zoning code violation that would subject the offender to civil 
penalties by the city.84 As soon as it was passed the ordinance was 
challenged in court by a medical marijuana patient who objected to the 
assessment of  civil penalties for growing medical marijuana for his 
personal use in his home.85 The Michigan Supreme Court ultimately struck 
down the Wyoming ordinance, reasoning that the Michigan Medical 
Marihuana Program preempts any state or local laws that provide for 
penalties for the cultivation of medical marijuana in a manner inconsistent 
with the Michigan Medical Marijuana Program.86 
The adoption of local land use controls that restricted the availability 
of medical marijuana by the city of Wyoming shows a value judgment made 
by the Wyoming City Council and its constituents that allowing medical 
marijuana access in Wyoming would have a detrimental effect on the city. 
This value judgment is derivable through Dewey’s method of valuation. The 
situation perceived by the Wyoming city council and the citizens of 
Wyoming was that medical marijuana wouldbe distributed in the city 
 
 
82 “’If communities don’t want this [Proposition 64], then it shouldn’t be forced down their throats. 
At the same time, those who want it shouldn’t be stopped.” The Cannabist, Colorado cities and towns 
take diverging paths on recreational pot, DENVER POST (December 29th, 2014), 
http://www.denverpost.com/2014/12/29/colorado-cities-and-towns-take-diverging-paths-on-
recreational-pot/.  
83 WYOMING, MICH. CODE OF ORDINANCES § 90-66 (2010); see also Beek v. City of Wyoming, 
495 Mich. App. Ct. 1, 5-6 (2014). 
84 See Beek, 495 Mich. App. Ct. at 6.  
85 See id. 
86 See id. at 24-25. 
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pursuant to the Michigan Medical Marihuana Program. The facts 
surrounding the situation, as perceived by the city council, was that 1) 
medical marijuana is a threat to the health, safety, and public welfare of the 
residents and businesses of Wyoming, Michigan and 2) because the city 
council believed that the Michigan Medical Marihuana Program was 
contrary to federal law and invalid.87 Given the situations and these 
perceived facts, the means most conducive to resolving the situation was to 
prohibit medical marijuana dispensaries from all Wyoming zoning 
classifications. This choice of means, if left unchallenged, would have the 
effect of removing commercial access to medical marijuana from Wyoming 
and forcing medical marijuana patients in Wyoming to travel to other 
municipalities that allow distribution of medical marijuana to obtain 
treatment for their symptoms. 
The City of Riverside in California passed an ordinance that made 
operation of a medical marijuana dispensary or distribution center a 
prohibited use of land and a public nuisance within the city of Riverside.88 
Riverside, like Wyoming, Michigan, further declared as a nuisance any use 
that is prohibited by state or federal law.89 Riverside’s prohibition against 
the operation of medical marijuana dispensaries in its jurisdiction was 
justified by the city government on the grounds that medical marijuana 
dispensaries are illegal under federal law and are “indecent, offensive to the 
senses, and interfere with the use and enjoyment of property[.]”90 By 
enacting this ordinance, the Riverside city government indicated a belief 
that medical marijuana dispensaries were public nuisances that needed to be 
kept out of the city.  
Riverside, believing that medical marijuana dispensaries engaging in 
collective distribution of medical marijuana to patients is a public nuisance, 
found that the means most conducive to ensuring that medical marijuana 
dispensaries could not locate within Riverside would be an outright 
prohibition of dispensaries through the zoning ordinance. Riverside’s end 
in view was to prevent the proliferation of medical marijuana dispensaries, 
which many of its citizens and lawmakers saw as a flagrant violation of 
 
 
87 “[T]he City attempted to take into consideration how the provisions of this Act would affect the 
health, safety and welfare of its citizens in both residential neighborhoods and commercial and industrial 
zones.” Def.’s Br. 1 on Appeal, WL 6847543.  
88 RIVERSIDE, CAL. MUNICIPAL CODE §§ 19.150.020-19.150.020(A). “Medical Marijuana 
Dispensary” is excluded from the permitted uses in every zoning classification set forth by the Riverside 
zoning code. This means that it is unlawful to build or operate a medical marijuana dispensary inside the 
city of Riverside. 
89 Id. 
90 Def.’s Mot. Prelim. Inj. 1, WL 9037950.  
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federal law, without displacing state policy. A method by which the city of 
Riverside could attain this end would be to utilize an avenue of traditionally 
local authority, zoning and land use ordinances, to enact a ban on the siting 
of medical marijuana dispensaries in the city of Riverside. 
The cities of Wyoming and Riverside expressed strikingly similar 
values in response to medical marijuana legalization efforts in their 
respective states. They are examples of local values forming in response to 
expressed state values. The local values at play in Wyoming and Riverside 
are conceivably akin to the statement, “We, as a community, understand that 
medical marijuana has been legalized on a state level. We do not want 
medical marijuana being sold in our city because we believe that marijuana 
is illegal at the federal level and because it is a nuisance.” Such values were 
challenged and the validity of the land use regulations that express such 
values were litigated in state courts, as seen in Beek v. City of Wyoming91 
and City of Riverside v. Inland Empire Patients Health and Wellness 
Center.92 These cases, and the extent to which they reflect the supremacy of 
state values over local values, will be expanded upon in Part V, below. 
 
B. Recreational Marijuana 
At the time of writing, recreational marijuana legalization and 
regulation by states like Colorado and California continues to stir 
controversy over policy values. As with medical marijuana, despite general 
state policies in favor of legalization, value judgments about the effects of 
marijuana spur the adoption of local land use regulations for recreational 
marijuana uses. The distance requirements contained in the Denver Zoning 
Code and Retail Marijuana Code reflect a desire to separate marijuana from 
certain “vulnerable” uses. Marijuana dispensaries and cultivation facilities 
are prohibited from locating near schools, drug and alcohol rehabilitation 
centers, daycares, and other marijuana businesses.93 Such regulations 
indicate a perception that marijuana poses a threat or is obnoxious to the 
above-mentioned uses.  
Denver’s city council, in amending their zoning and recreational 
marijuana ordinance to account for the legalization of marijuana on a state 
level, considered the potential for “vulnerable” persons such as children and 
drug addicts and certain neighborhoods to be exposed to marijuana to be a 
problem.94 The city council conceivably concluded that the course of action 
 
 
91 Beek, 495 Mich. App. Ct. at 1.  
92 Id.  
93 City of Riverside v. Inland Empire Patients Health and Wellness Center, 56 Cal. 4th 729 (2013). 
94 Jeremy P. Meyer, Denver City Council begins discussing big pot issues: taxes, zoning, DENVER 
POST (Aug. 18th, 2013), http://www.denverpost.com/2013/08/18/denver-city-council-begins-
discussing-big-pot-issues-taxes-zoning/. Some on the Denver city council specifically wanted zoning 
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most conducive to resolving this problem would be to impose the substantial 
spacing requirements discussed in Part I, infra. Applying Dewey’s theory 
of valuation discussed in Part II to this set of facts results in the conclusion 
that Denver’s city council regards marijuana as a detrimental land use. 
Denver’s city council, when formulating its policy that it was going to 
adopt with respect to regulating recreational marijuana dispensaries within 
its borders, engaged in deliberation pursuant to Dewey’s theory of 
valuation. Every member of the Denver city council weighed the applicable 
facts as they existed at the time, and they weighed the consequences that 
their proposed courses of action would have on themselves and their 
constituents.95 Having done so, the Denver city council determined that the 
means most conducive to ensuring that sensitive land uses are protected 
from marijuana-related land uses would be to insert a spacing requirement 
into the zoning code.96 The city council could conceivably conclude that 
such a spacing requirement would be sufficient to preserve the ability of 
marijuana-related land uses to locate within Denver, but would also ensure 
that marijuana-related land uses would not threaten sensitive uses.  
Part V: State Values are Superior to Local Values and Ought to Prevail 
 The tension between values reflected through legislation at state and 
local levels with respect to marijuana land use controls is well reflected in 
recent case law. As discussed in Part I, the cities of Riverside, California 
and Wyoming, Michigan each passed ordinances, through their respective 
zoning procedures, banning the siting of marijuana dispensaries within their 
borders.97 Aggrieved citizens in each city brought suits or appeals 
challenging the validity of such zoning classifications based upon 
arguments that state policy in favor of decriminalization of medical 
marijuana precluded the cities from adopting ordinances that prohibited 
marijuana dispensaries.98 The state supreme courts of California and 
Michigan issued divergent decisions: the California Supreme Court upheld 
 
 
buffer zones that would limit the placement of marijuana dispensaries to a select few sites in Denver, 
mostly near the edges of the city. 
95 An extremely important fact existing at the time that Denver’s city council formulated its zoning 
policies with respect to regulating recreational marijuana was the fact that Colorado voters, a great 
number of whom living in Denver, had approved the legalization of recreational marijuana. This created 
a mandate in favor of permitting, while also regulating, the provision and consumption of recreational 
marijuana inside Denver’s borders. 
96 See id. 
97 Beek v. City of Wyoming, 495 Mich. App. Ct. 1 (2014); City of Riverside v. Inland Empire 
Patients Health & Wellness Center, Inc., 56 Cal. 4th 729 (2013). 
98 Beek, 495 Mich. App. Ct. at 6; Inland Empire, 56 Cal. 4th at 738. 
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the city of Riverside’s zoning classifications, while the Michigan Supreme 
Court invalidated the city of Wyoming’s zoning classifications.99   
The discrepancies between the California and Michigan Supreme 
Courts are ultimately describable in terms of meta-values. Meta-values are 
second-order values, meaning values about values. Since meta-values are 
second-order values, Dewey’s method of valuation, discussed in Part II 
above, controls their derivation. A judgment that one set of derived values 
ought to be adopted or followed over another set of derived values is itself 
a meta-value. An example of a meta-value is Dillon’s Rule, which 
constrains the powers of a local government in the absence of an express 
grant of power by a state. Dillon’s Rule is a value judgment prioritizing the 
reserved power of a state under the United States Constitution over the 
autonomy of local governments. Essentially, Dillon’s Rule places a 
premium on state power over municipal autonomy.  
Applying Dewey’s method of valuation to deriving the meta-value of 
Dillon’s Rule, states have an end-in-view of creating local governments to 
assist the state government in governing its populace. Given that the 
existence of cities is not contemplated by the United States Constitution, 
and that states reserve power not explicitly and exclusively held by the 
federal government, states may logically conclude that the means most 
conducive to creating local governments is for states to create local 
governments by statute. At this point, states have a choice to either grant 
local governments expansive powers or to grant local governments 
circumscribed and limited powers.100  
If states choose to adopt a set of values that confer broad, expansive 
authority to local governments, to the point where local governments enjoy 
all power that is not explicitly denied to them, then local governments have 
the potential to pursue interests that are antithetical to those of the state 
government. If, by contrast, state governments adopt values that grant local 
governments a narrowly defined and exclusive set of powers, then the local 
governments have much less license to buck state authority and pursue local 
interests at the expense of state interests. The latter choice of values is 
Dillon’s Rule and is more conducive to achieving the end-in-view of 
creating local governments to assist the state government in governing its 
populace and is therefore the set of values that ought to be adopted. In the 
event one believes that local governments are better equipped to govern a 
state’s population than the state government, then home rule, rather than 
 
 
99 Beek, 495 Mich. App. Ct. at 19-20; Inland Empire, 56 Cal. 4th at 762. 
100 See Part I(D) and accompanying discussion above. When deciding the extent of autonomy they 
will allow local governments, states must inevitably choose between Dillon’s Rule or home rule. 
Essentially, states are choosing the quality and quantity of values that local governments will be able to 
enact as policy for themselves. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol10/iss2/8
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Dillon’s Rule, would be more conducive to achieving that end. 
The California Supreme Court disagreed in its Inland Empire opinion 
with the notion that local authority ought to be circumscribed by broader 
state authority in 2015 when it upheld Riverside’s zoning classifications that 
excluded marijuana dispensaries from uses permitted in Riverside.101 The 
Court reasoned that California’s Medical Marijuana Program did not confer 
positive rights to possess, cultivate, or sell medical marijuana.102 Rather, 
according to the Court, California’s Compassionate Use Act and its Medical 
Marijuana Program did not operate to displace local home rule discretion to 
completely prohibit the placement of a marijuana dispensary in their 
jurisdictions through land use regulations.103 As discussed above in Part III, 
California is a home rule state, which means that local governments in 
California possess all powers not explicitly withheld from them by the 
Constitution and statutes of the state of California. 
California’s embrace of home rule evinces a meta-valuation in favor of 
granting local governments broader authority because they are better suited 
to governing their populations than the state government. Operating behind 
the scenes in the California Supreme Court’s opinion is the very same meta-
value. Home rule, like Dillon’s Rule, is ultimately a meta-value held at the 
state level that defines local government authority, thus local values are 
given importance by and are subject to state meta-values, even when they 
do not conflict.  
In contrast to the California Supreme Court, the Michigan Supreme 
Court invalidated the city of Wyoming’s prohibition on marijuana 
dispensaries with its Beek decision.104 The Beek Court reasoned that state 
policy in favor of decriminalizing medical marijuana and establishing a 
statewide Medical Marihuana Program to regulate medical marijuana 
displaced local policies that sought to restrict or prohibit access to medical 
marijuana.105 As noted above, Michigan’s Medical Marihuana Program 
closely resembles California’s Medical Marijuana Program in many 
respects, including the fact that neither program grants affirmative rights to 
 
 
101 “[T]he MMP’s limited provisions neither expressly nor impliedly restrict or preempt the 
authority of individual local jurisdictions to…prohibit collective or cooperative medical marijuana 
activities within their own borders.” Inland Empire, 56 Cal. 4th at 762. 
102 “[T]hey [the Compassionate Use Act and Medical Marijuana Program Act] do not establish a 
comprehensive state system of legalized medical marijuana; or grant a ‘right’ of convenient access to 
marijuana for medical use; or override the zoning, licensing, and police powers of local jurisdictions; or 
mandate local accommodation of medical marijuana cooperatives, collectives, or dispensaries.” Id. at 
762-63. 
103 Id. 
104 Beek, 495 Mich. App. Ct. at 1. 
105 Id. at 24-25.  
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possess, cultivate, or sell medical marijuana to patients or caregivers, but 
rather afford protection from civil or criminal penalties.106 The Michigan 
Supreme Court’s invalidation of Wyoming’s zoning ordinance purportedly 
turned on the construction of the provision of Michigan law that protects 
medical marijuana patients and caregivers from being subject to “penalty in 
any manner.”107 The Michigan Supreme Court construed “penalty in any 
manner” to include penalties for violation of zoning ordinances arising from 
siting medical marijuana dispensaries in municipalities that exclude medical 
marijuana dispensaries as permitted uses.108 Thus, the Wyoming ordinance 
was invalid because it created local civil penalties for placing medical 
marijuana dispensaries that were otherwise valid under the Michigan 
Medical Marihuana Program.109  
The Beek decision announced that the Michigan Supreme Court was 
willing to override local land use ordinances to effectuate access to medical 
marijuana that comports with the Michigan Medical Marihuana Program. 
Thus, the Michigan Supreme Court adopted meta-values that prioritize state 
policy over local policy, at least with respect to medical marijuana. In light 
of the discussion regarding California’s meta-values above, the Beek court’s 
value judgment makes sense and is in harmony with Dewey’s valuation 
method.  
Inland Empire and Beek illustrate the fact that meta-values explain the 
relationship between state and local governments. Both cases show that 
state meta-values, whether set by the state constitution or by statute, 
delineate the amount of power that local governments have. In this manner, 
meta-values also set the stage for the next showdown in the ongoing 
marijuana policy battle taking place in the United States. While states 
operate their medical and recreational marijuana programs, they do so in 
violation of federal law. The ongoing violation of federal law by such states 
leaves the medical and recreational marijuana businesses vulnerable to 
enforcement actions by the Drugs Enforcement Agency under federal law.   
As legalization on the federal level becomes less likely with the 
presidency of Donald J. Trump as President of the United States and 
Republican leadership in the U.S. Congress, the states will continue to rise 
in prominence as the principal drivers of innovation with respect to 
developing public policy regarding marijuana. Attorney General Jeff 
Sessions, by rescinding a Justice Department policy that shielded marijuana 
enterprises from federal prosecution in states that legalized marijuana, re-
ignited a marijuana policy battle between the federal government and states 
 
 
106 Id. at 23-24. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
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that legalized marijuana in any form.110 Dewey’s theory of valuation will be 
ever-present during every stage of the policy fight, providing justifications 
for all sides of the legalization issue. 
 
Part VI: Conclusion  
 
Every individual’s values are unique to that person. The values held by 
a community, as a whole, are unique to that community because that 
community is comprised of individuals who themselves hold unique values. 
The differences between individual and community values are mediated by 
meta-values, which are values about values. Meta-values can take many 
different forms, from placing a premium on democratic processes 
(mediation of individual values) to placing a premium on federalism, home 
rule, and local autonomy (mediation of community values). Dewey’s theory 
of valuation explains the process of deriving individual and community 
values, as well as deriving meta-values. This fact is illustrated by individual 
and community values with respect to the legalization of marijuana for 
medical and recreation purposes. As shown, different communities react 
differently, in accordance with their values, to the issue of marijuana 
legalization. Meta-values, as second-order values, should be accorded more 
weight than first-order values because they govern the creation and 
interaction of values. 
 As marijuana legalization efforts progress in the United States in the 
post-Obama era, there will likely be a renewed focus on state and local 
governments and the policies that they enact in response to legalization 
efforts nationwide. The values held by citizens at the state level and the 
values held at a local level will inevitably collide. Meta-values will be the 
mediating factor that decides whether local values will be preempted by 
state or federal values. A discussion of Dewey’s theory of valuation, as 
applied to the creation of criminal statutes, would assist in clarifying the 
derivation of values and meta-values in the criminal aspect of the law. 
 
 
110 This Note does not address the meta-value that is arguably present in Article VI of the United 
States Constitution. One could argue that the existence of the Supremacy Clause in the Constitution 
shows a meta-value held by the founders of the United States that federal policies should always 
supervene state policy.  
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